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THE PROMISE AND LIMITS OF CYBER POWER IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW
This panel was convened at 2:15 p.m., Thursday, June 25, 2020, by its moderator Monica
Hakimi of the University of Michigan Law School, who introduced the panelists: Sue
Robertson of the Ofﬁce of International Law, Attorney-General’s Department Australia; Charles
Allen of the Ofﬁce of General Counsel, U.S. Department of Defense; Zhixiong Huang of Wuhan
University School of Law; Ann Väljataga of the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of
Excellence; and Doug Wilson of the UK Government Communications Headquarters.

I NTRODUCTORY R EMARKS BY MONICA HAKIMI *
Hi, everyone. I am Monica Hakimi from the University of Michigan Law School, and I would
like to welcome you to our panel on cyber power and its limits. The topic almost does not need an
introduction. We all know just from reading the news that our collective dependence on cyberspace
is also a huge vulnerability, and state and non-state actors exploit this vulnerability to do one
another harm. They use cyber technologies not just to spy on one another, but also, for example,
to interfere in national elections, to steal trade secrets or other valuable information, to disrupt the
activities of political, military, or economic institutions, and at times to cause physical destruction
or death.
Moreover, because these technologies allow the perpetrators to obscure their identities or the full
effects of their operations, the people and institutions that are affected do not always have the
relevant information to protect themselves from future attacks or to respond.
In 2013, a group of governmental experts stated that “[i]nternational law, in particular,
the Charter of the United Nations, is applicable and is essential to maintaining peace and
stability and promoting an open, secure, peaceful and accessible information communication
technologies (ICT).”1
Later instruments have conﬁrmed and elaborated slightly on the premise that the general
principles of international law apply in the cyber domain, but there continue to be questions
about how it applies and how it might be supplemented by other non-binding norms to regulate
cyber conduct. These are the questions that we want to explore today.
I am delighted to introduce our panelists, which I will do relatively brieﬂy in order to save time
for discussion, and I will ask, given our format, that you raise your hand as I introduce you so our
viewers can identify you. First, we have Charles Allen, who has served as deputy general counsel
for international affairs at the U.S. Department of Defense since 2000; second, Zhixiong Huang,
who is a professor at Wuhan University School of Law and has served as one of the experts who
worked on the Tallinn Manual 2.0 Cyberspace Law Project; third, Sue Robertson, who serves as
ﬁrst assistant secretary of the international division in the Ofﬁce of the Attorney General of
* University of Michigan Law School. What follows is a slightly modiﬁed transcription of the panel presentation.
1
UN Doc. A/68/98, para. 19.
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Australia and has previously served in the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade;
next, Ann Väljataga, who has served as an international law researcher at the NATO
Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence since 2016; and last but certainly not least,
Doug Wilson, who was formerly the legal director at the Foreign Commonwealth Ofﬁce and is
now at the UK Government Communications Headquarters.
We have decided to organize this panel more as a conversation than as a series of presentations. I
will pose some questions to the panelists to facilitate the conversation among them, and will incorporate as much as possible some of the questions that ASIL received through the online format in
anticipation of this panel.
To start, I want to focus on the question of what activities when conducted by states in the cyber
domain are internationally wrongful. Ann, perhaps I could start with you and ask this question:
when one state uses another state’s territory to engage in some kind of cyber conduct—for example, to use its servers—without that territorial state’s consent, does that, per se, violate some principle of international law, such as the principle of state sovereignty or territorial integrity?

REMARKS

BY A NN

VÄLJATAGA *

According to my reading of the Tallinn Manual, it still seems that there are many determinant
factors regarding manifestation of the use of cyber infrastructure, and if the manifestation itself
brings about something that could be described as violation of sovereignty, then yes. But at the
same time, this is not a crystallized principal rule, and when you compare this kind of position
to what the law says or what practice even says in other domains, then we see that it is a bit in
conﬂict because, for instance, the mayor trespassing into the area of territory of another state is
breach of sovereignty. Therefore, it is still up there, but most likely it will depend on the manifestation. If the uses are peaceful, as such, then probably it would not be described as a breach of
sovereignty.
But then again, we come to maybe the major apple of discord of cyber law in these states. It is
whether sovereignty as such can be breached, or is it merely a guiding principle and not a rule that
you have to obey or you are violating it?

M ONICA H AKIMI
If I am understanding correctly, you are saying that there is a question about whether the mere
use of another state’s territory without its consent violates state sovereignty and is unlawful for that
reason or needs to violate some other principle of international law to be unlawful. Is that correct?

ANN V ÄLJATAGA
The thing is what does consent mean. If, for example, one state is using the servers that are
located on the territory of another state, yet still operated by a private actor, and they are using
them for peaceful purposes or even, as some experts have claimed, for perhaps purposes of interception of espionage, then whether or not it is a breach of sovereignty is still disputable.

M ONICA H AKIMI
Zhixiong Huang, I saw you gesture. Did you want to jump in?
* NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence.
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ZHIXIONG H UANG *

I think this question very much depends on how sovereignty and territorial integrity is to be
deﬁned and interpreted in the cyber context, and we can see states and scholars do have quite different views. For example, if we look at the position paper released by France last September, it
states “any cyberattack against a French digital system or any effect produced on French territory
by digital means” attributable to another state would constitute a breach of French sovereignty.
Then very likely for France the answer would be yes. But as was mentioned just now, there are
also states holding that sovereignty is not a rule of international law containing concrete obligations. So for them, the answer, I think, would clearly be no.
China, as far as I know, has not yet made its position very clear, but my understanding is it is
likely China will be, more or less, in agreement with the French position.

M ONICA H AKIMI
Chuck, please go ahead.

REMARKS

BY

C HARLES ALLEN **

Yes. Thank you very much. I noted that Ann mentioned the dichotomy between sovereignty as a
rule and as, on the other hand, a principle, and that was also discussed by our Chinese colleague.
What I would like to say is that in the United States, we really try to grapple with these almost
intractable issues, as Monica mentioned at the outset. In a series of speeches by U.S. ofﬁcials
going back to Legal Adviser Harold Koh in 2012, Legal Adviser Brian Egan in 2016, and then
most recently in more of a shortened version by the general counsel of the Department of
Defense, Paul Ney, we have addressed these issues. I also note that the UK attorney general in
2018, in a very persuasive speech, addressed these issues as well.
Our view, at least at this point—and we understand things are evolving—is that there is not a
sufﬁciently widespread and consistent state practice, resulting from a sense of legal obligation, to
conclude that customary international law generally prohibits such non-consensual operations in
another state’s territory. This conclusion is with the important caveat that the action, the “intrusion,” if you will, does not constitute a prohibited intervention or use of force. That is, the action
does not interfere in violation of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter in a country’s right against incursions on its territorial integrity or political independence.
I think that the UK attorney general’s speech is particularly persuasive on this point in saying that
sovereignty is, of course, fundamental—and the United States agrees with that—to the international rules-based system. But we do not see that there is a rule as a matter of current international
law that prohibits us from, as the United States has said recently, being able to “defend forward,”
perhaps including with incursions in other countries, to protect such vital elements as elections,
election results, the integrity of the election process.

M ONICA H AKIMI
Okay, wonderful. Thank you. Sue, let me turn to you. First, do you want to state Australia’s position on this particular question? Then, let us move to a more speciﬁc question. If we accept, as some
* Wuhan University School of Law, China.
** Ofﬁce of General Counsel, U.S. Department of Defense.
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argue, that cyber conduct does not necessarily violate a general sovereignty norm, can we get any
traction out of the principle of non-interference? Let us focus on conduct that interferes in a
national election. What kinds of election interference might actually violate the principle of
non-interference? Must the interference involve an element of coercion to violate it? And if it
so, what qualiﬁes as coercion in this context?

REMARKS

BY

S UE ROBERTSON*

Thanks, Monica. I think in relation to this issue of the rule or the principle of sovereignty, like the
UK and the United States, Australia’s position is we are not quite there yet, that this is a contested
view. Some states—such as France and the Netherlands—have said they are in favor of it. We do
not have a public position as of yet. We think the question is a challenging one, but that state practice is basically still evolving in this area.
I might also pick up on something our Chinese colleague, Professor Huang, just mentioned as
well, that the issue of interpretation of the different principles is key here. For example, it may be
that, depending on a state’s interpretation of prohibited intervention, there may not be a lot of difference in practice between a violation of sovereignty and a violation of prohibited intervention,
but it depends on where those lines are actually drawn.
But, of course, Australia does believe in the principle of state sovereignty in cyberspace, and
obviously, a state has sovereignty over its cyber infrastructure, for example, located on its territory
and the cyber activities that it does on its own territory.
You raised the question more speciﬁcally of electoral intervention, which is a classic gray zone
area where there may be a whole lot of activity that goes on that is not internationally wrongful and
falls short of a prohibited intervention. I should say that for states, cyber interconnectedness has
raised the stakes on a whole lot of critical infrastructure and governance processes, not just elections, and a huge focus of legal advising is on how to protect that critical infrastructure that can
obviously affect millions of people and their well-being, in terms of hospitals, electricity, ﬁnance,
and those sort of realms.
I think it is important to say that states do have a variety of tools, and international law is one of
them. But turning to this issue of prohibited intervention, as we know, it has two components, two
constituent parts. First, a state must interfere by coercive means, and they must intervene in
the domaine réservé, something that is essentially within the right of that state to control and
choose. We have talked about this in various ways, and I would say that out of domaine réservé
and coercion, coercion is generally the more difﬁcult to advise on. I think that is because it is still
an indeterminate concept in some ways. It cannot be merely persuasion or pressure. That is just a
matter of statecraft. We know from Nicaragua that it goes to this issue of states’ choices, which must
remain free ones.
Just quickly, on the example of elections, I think Australia would agree with the UK Attorney
General and others who have said this, and our Attorney-General has also made some statements
on it, that cyber operations that manipulate an electoral system would satisfy that test. And I think
others, including the Netherlands and the UK, have agreed on that. But I think it is an open question,
the extent to which other types of interference in elections actually reach this threshold or not, and
perhaps we could talk about interference in the U.S. democratic elections, for example, in 2016 in
which the U.S. government did not respond by characterizing those necessarily as an international

* Ofﬁce of International Law, Attorney-General’s Department Australia.
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wrong. They took a lot of other steps, using tools such as sanctions and criminal prosecutions and so
on. So I think that does raise the issue. That does show how difﬁcult this issue can be.

M ONICA H AKIMI
Doug, please go ahead.

REMARKS

BY

D OUG W ILSON*

Thank you, Monica, and thanks to you and ASIL for having me. It is a real pleasure to be alongside such distinguished fellow panelists, many of whom it is a pleasure to see again.
I just wanted to take us back, if I may, to the conceptual elements of what we are discussing. We
are discussing the promise and limits of cyber power under international law, and I think it is important, just brieﬂy, to dwell on what cyber power means. For the UK, we have been positing a public
vision of what that concept entails, and there are three parts to it. There is the ability or the capability to protect the digital homeland, the cybersecurity element. There is the capability to project
power and inﬂuence through cyber means to disrupt what adversaries are doing, for example, when
the nation is threatened. Underpinning that, there is the legitimacy of strong legal regimes at the
domestic and international level. I think when we are discussing this, we ought to just bear in mind
those component parts because what you do in one area and how you describe what has been done
to you can affect your own ability to act. As international lawyers, we need to keep that balance in
mind.
For me, the way you introduced the ﬁrst question, I thought was absolutely spot on. The real
question we ought to be asking ourselves is a particular act or series of acts or line of activity internationally wrongful. As international lawyers in this space, we are often quite concerned with the
means of transportation rather than the destination. So we can have arguments about sovereignty
and how it materializes in terms of speciﬁc rules according to some or into what everyone agrees is
the rule around the prohibition on interference in internal affairs.
For the UK, the question really is whether the threshold of the prohibition or non-intervention
has been met in a particular case, and what we tried to do alongside other countries—the United
States, Australia, France, Netherlands, Estonia, and probably others in the mix too—is populate the
space with speciﬁc examples of what activity we think is internationally unlawful. We recognize
states can arrive at that destination, as I say, by different means.
The election example, as Sue has already said, is a really hard one. In the speech by our Attorney
General that Chuck was kind enough to mention—thank you, Chuck, ﬂattery will get you everywhere—we deliberately couched that as manipulation of an electoral system with the aim of altering the result. So what that does capture obviously is with voting registers, electronic voting, postal
voting, all of those kind of things, but where there is more scope for progressive development or
further discussion is around really tricky issues like disinformation and the whole host of issues
that Sue touched on in her intervention.
So for the UK, what we are really keen to do is see that space, the space of what is internationally
wrongful, populated by real discussion of both types of examples. I know we are going to come on
to some others, but what is unlawful in this space? What are the rules of activity in this area of
statecraft that we are all seeing develop and be used for, as you said in your introduction, rather
subversive means where countries are trying to disrupt and mislead states or their populations in a
* UK Government Communications Headquarters.
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really unhelpful way? How can we bring some order to that, and how can we set up the rules of
deterrence and proper conduct?

M ONICA H AKIMI
That is great. I would like to take you up on that suggestion and home in on a speciﬁc example.
Let us say there is a massive disinformation campaign that causes a population to call into question
the election results, but there is not signiﬁcant evidence of tampering with the machinery of the
election or the counting of votes. Would that, in your view, violate some principle of international
law? That is my ﬁrst question.
My second question, just to have two on the table, so I do as little talking as possible and you all
do as much as possible, is to what extent must states afﬁrmatively prevent wrongful conduct, however it is deﬁned, when conducted not by their own state agents but by some non-state actors either
in their territory or outside their territories? This is what is sometimes called a “due diligence obligation.” To what extent do states have a due diligence obligation, an obligation to exercise due
diligence to prevent non-state actors from engaging in harmful cyber conduct? And then, how
do we deﬁne the speciﬁcs of any due diligence obligation, to the extent that one exists?
So, Doug, since you raised the question, maybe I will come back to you and then do a round
robin with the other participants.

DOUG W ILSON
To answer your extremely hard question, it is possible that it could deﬁnitely reach that level of a
prohibited intervention, and a lot would depend on the facts.
But I would come back to what Sue said earlier. International law is one of an array of relevant
frameworks here and tools that can be used to combat that kind of thing. A lot depends on the persuasive effect you can have on social media companies or big tech. The active targeting of misinformation is not currently within the domestic regulatory framework, although around the world
you can see more interest in ﬁrming up the rules of the game and who is responsible for what.
You know what we are seeing right now in a number of places across the world? Big tech and
social media companies taking a much more proactive approach to this, which in itself carries a
whole host of tricky issues to answer.
When it comes to responsibilities around what is termed “due diligence,” of the UK, there is no
doubting that states have an obligation not to allow in a knowing way the territory to be used for
acts contrary to the rights of other states. We can go back to Corfu Channel for that proposition,
Whereas, there is a lot more caution for us around due diligence as the content of any such rule as a
good international lawyer working for a government. You want to be sure when you are accepting
the emergence of a new rule or adaptation of rules from one area of international law to another.
What does it really mean, and what does the content of that rule say? Because what we would not
want to do is oblige states to apply such levels of due diligence so that only a few states with a really
cutting-edge system of cybersecurity would be able to meet them. I do not think there is any value
in that, so, again, I am interested in what the content of any rule that is termed due diligence might
actually be. But there is no doubting underlying general international law obligation by use of territory, and it is just how it applies and what the standards are in that space.

M ONICA H AKIMI
Sue, do you want to follow up?
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S UE ROBERTSON
Thanks, Monica. I think Mike Schmitt looked at these issues really well and talked about both
views. In one example, if an election result is not manipulated, is that sufﬁcient to reach the level of
a prohibited intervention? But he then put forward the other view, that misinformation can actually
cause events to unfold in democratic processes that would otherwise not have occurred, and I think
there is deﬁnitely some merit in that. But it also highlights the real sticky problem we face that the
effects of various forms of indirect and direct misinformation and malicious cyber activity may not
be known until a particular time, and so as time unfolds, things may actually get worse. I know
there has been some interesting commentary on that recently about interference in elections
where the effects can actually become worse over time. So we are left judging at a particular
point in time.
I think that the fact that a state does not characterize an activity as meeting a threshold does not
necessarily mean that they do not share that view that it does. It is a bit of that “secret life of international law” that Daniel Bethlehem talks about so well. For a whole variety of reasons, they may
not have decided to characterize an activity in a legal way, whether it is to protect a source or
because they can achieve their political shaming through another mechanism.
Due diligence is a really good example. It is one we are still thinking about and it will become
increasingly important as attribution just remains so difﬁcult. Our view is that it is unclear the
extent to which states are obliged to exercise due diligence, and that is because of that lack of crystallization. That is why we have been really supportive of the development of norms and more soft
principles through the UN Group of Governmental Experts and other processes because we believe
it is deﬁnitely worth exploring and taking a realistic approach, as Doug has already mentioned. I
think that it is important to actually say what would be expected for due diligence and what level of
knowledge is required. There are interesting questions about constructive knowledge as well.
There are a lot more questions than answers for us at this stage, but I think that even putting to
one side legal characterizations, politically, it is going to become harder and harder for states to
ignore the harmful activities that come from their jurisdictions.

M ONICA H AKIMI
Chuck, did you want to weigh in on that question?

CHARLES A LLEN
Yes, just brieﬂy, because I think that Douglas and Sue really handled it about as well as one can.
It is an intractable problem to know whether a disinformation campaign amounts to the kind of
coercion that would be actionable. I appreciate Sue’s very clear statement of the International
Court of Justice Nicaragua case principles, which would apply.
Some of the U.S. Department of Defense’s thinking has been made clear particularly in General
Counsel Ney’s speech in March 2020, not necessarily in the international law part of the speech,
but in talking about the U.S. approach in attempting to deal with the interference that has occurred.
Once again, we describe it as “defend forward.” We believe that it is appropriate to be able to
defend forward, including, consistent with the principle of sovereignty, but nevertheless to be
able to defend forward to counter foreign cyber activity that targets the United States—the case
in point being the integrity of the election process. We believe that this indeed comports with
our obligations and our commitment to a rules-based international order. But, again, I am not
sure I can add very much substantively to what Sue and Doug said.
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On the due diligence question, the U.S. statement as part of the UN Group of Governmental
Experts (GGE) work in 2016–2017 indicated that we did not see that there was an obligation of
due diligence. I think it is generally true that states are not exercising due diligence. So from a perspective of custom and practice, it is hard to say that there is that obligation.
On the other hand, it is just as true that, as has been said, states do not have a right to conduct or
harbor in their territory cyber activities that are used to harm other states. Again, we would say that
U.S. efforts, including defending forward, to counter such activities would not be a violation of the
principle of non-intervention.
Having said that, and suggesting there is not an obligation of due diligence, I do think that the
sovereignty principle reﬂects that there are both responsibilities and authorities. If an activity is
conducted within a state’s jurisdiction, the state has certain accompanying duties to ensure the
activities are not used to harm other states, for example, in violation of Article 2(4) of the Charter.

M ONICA H AKIMI
Okay, great. Let s shift from the question of what conduct is prohibited or required of states and
turn instead to the question of how states may lawfully respond in the event that they are affected by
some cyber conduct? Let us start with the difﬁcult question of when cyber conduct qualiﬁes as an
armed attack, so as to trigger the right to use defensive force, whether collectively or individually.
To be as speciﬁc as possible, I will put this scenario on the table. Imagine a situation in which a
cyberattack does not cause physical destruction or death but rather, for example, causes a military
installation to stall out for an extended period of time, such that that installation is inoperable, not in
the midst of an armed conﬂict but in ordinary times. Would that attack qualify as an armed attack so
as to trigger the right to use defensive force, or must the cyberattack cause signiﬁcant physical
destruction or death in order to trigger that right? Zhixiong, maybe I could start with you and
get your views on it.

ZHIXIONG HUANG
I think the issue of what constitutes an armed attack in the cyber context has not yet been settled,
and the law is still evolving. Overall, I think the determination will have to be made based on a
case-by-case assessment, taking into consideration such factors as scale and effect and also other
factors like the intention of the operation.
But I do not think we can conclude deﬁnitely that if a cyber operation caused damages or death,
then it would constitute an armed attack. For example, if a police ofﬁcer or a member of the army of
State A intentionally kills a national of State B without further justiﬁcation, in my view, this would
be an internationally wrongful act of State A, and legal responsibility will incur. But for the purpose
of our discussion, this may or may not be seen as an armed attack. This is what I understand the
situation in the real world, but in cyberspace, how can we deﬁnitely conclude that as long as a
cyberattack caused death or physical damage, then it is an armed attack? It is my view that a number of factors should be considered.

M ONICA H AKIMI
There are two questions on the table. One is at what point a cyber act that actually causes physical
destruction or death amounts to an armed attack, and a second question is whether it is ever possible for a cyber act that does not cause physical destruction or death but causes some other harm—
and I am using a harm directed at the military because that seems like the most obvious kind of
other harm—to amount to an armed attack. With those two questions on the table, what I will do is
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ask our governmental experts to weigh in, and then, Ann, I would like to come back to you when
we talk about countermeasures. Chuck, please go ahead.

CHARLES A LLEN
I believe your question is pointing not necessarily to the worst types of cases such as, for example, causing a failure that triggers a nuclear plant meltdown, where there would not be doubt about
whether it constituted a use of force. Also, a cyber act that opened a dam above a populated area and
drowned people below would clearly be a use of force. As Professor Huang just indicated, we
would have to look at the facts as they come, on a case-by-case basis. One can imagine a cyber
action that might cause a physical effect but that would not necessarily amount to a use of force. On
the other hand, to address your second scenario, I can see a case in which a cyber action may cause
no physical effect—for example, does not harm people by shutting off oxygen to a hospital’s
patients who need it to survive, and people die—but rather, let us consider the situation you
posit, talking about military systems. A country has a right to use its armed forces to defend itself,
and it needs to be prepared to do so as situations and threats arise. If, as a result of a cyberattack, let
us say even the logistics systems of the military are imperiled, are immobilized, so that the country’s ability to conduct and sustain military operations in its own defense, in its own national interest—I think that could be considered a use of force under jus ad bellum, which may warrant a
response that would be subject to the requirements, as always, of military necessary and
proportionality.
Again, it would have to be looked at based on the facts presented. Let us say that the cyberattack
slows down the logistics system by three days in its deliveries to the forces—then probably this
would not warrant a response in self-defense. On the other hand, if the attack truly crippled the
logistics systems so that your airplanes cannot ﬂy, your ships cannot sail—then that might be a
different story.

M ONICA H AKIMI
Doug?

DOUG W ILSON
Thank you, Monica. If I may say so, I feel for your students because you are always asking these
really hard questions. I agree with what Zhixiong and Chuck said.
I would add two extra points for my own perspective. One is underscoring the intent point. Did
the attack aim to do something more, and did cybersecurity or luck or whatever actually prevent
that harm? Because you ought not to be punished as a state or restricted in your response because
you are able to defend against an attack that was going to do something much worse. That is part of
the consideration that has been laid out already.
The second point I would make is, does it matter? Because what are you looking to do back, or
how are you looking to respond? Are you looking to use diplomatic means? Are you looking to use
other means of exerting pressure like sanctions? Are you looking to take cyber activity in response,
in which case you would use the framework that applies here for the UK? That would be what is
permissible around our domestic legal framework, which is very tightly constrained and has considerable independent scrutiny.
And then what does international law permit in these circumstances? If you are signed up to a
rule of sovereignty that is very constraining, that will limit you, and you need to go through that
gateway means in order to justify any response. Whereas if you are applying the approach that
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Chuck outlined earlier and that General Counsel Ney has talked about, that our Attorney General
has talked about, you have got more freedom of maneuver in the cyber world to respond to these
types of things without having to pin down exactly what has happened to you—in the way that
would help me avoid answering your really difﬁcult question.

M ONICA H AKIMI
My students try to do the same thing. Sue, would you like to weigh in on this question, or would
you like to move on to the question of countermeasures? I think Doug teed up the next question by
saying that, in many circumstances, states will choose not to respond with force. They will choose
to take other measures, and that brings us to countermeasures.

S UE ROBERTSON
Yes. One point I just wanted to make is that, as fascinating as questions of international humanitarian law and the use of force are—and we all love writing and reading about them—the use of
force and IHL are not the bread and butter of my advising day to day. I would say the gray area
probably takes up 99 percent of my time. That does not mean that questions of IHL and the use of
force are not important, but I think it does go to Doug’s point. Of course, how you characterize
things matters, but I do not think states are looking to characterize things as a use of force because
the appropriate response may well be something quite different. And you really just want to end the
very cyber activities that are going on.
I think the basic point is that, as a matter of law, the Article 51 of the Charter will apply. It will
apply in cyberspace. It is not easy because of the indirect and direct consequences, because of what
Doug said, it may or may not be successful. I certainly agree that it is difﬁcult to think of examples
that reach the threshold of an armed attack where physical destruction or death have not occurred. I
think that is quite difﬁcult, but rather than focusing on immediate physical effect, I think a more
useful framework that we could use would be to focus on the reasonably foreseeable consequences
of a particular cyber operation and the level of interference in state function.
On countermeasures, yes, that is an important consequence of ﬁnding an international wrong.
They have their own limitations, of course, but they are an important consequence that states can
explore.

M ONICA H AKIMI
Okay. Just for viewers at home, when we speak of countermeasures, we generally refer to conduct that is otherwise unlawful but is permitted in response to an unlawful act by the other side.
Here, the question is when may a state suspend its ordinary obligations in response to an unlawful
cyberattack? There is, of course, another category of unfriendly conduct that a state might take in
response to an attack. Retorsions are not otherwise prohibited and are always available to a state.
So a victim state may presumably use retorsions in response to a cyberattack or otherwise.
But let us just focus on countermeasures. Let us assume that a cyberattack of some kind causes a
harm that is prescribed by international law, and so a state has a right to respond with countermeasures as limited by international law. Ann, I would like to get your view on whether other states that
are not directly affected by the cyberattack may also respond with countermeasures—whether
there is what is known as a right to take collective countermeasures in response to an unlawful
cyber act.
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ANN V ÄLJATAGA
This is a particular aspect where Estonian President Kersti Kaljulaid made an unexpectedly revolutionary statement last May during the opening speech of CyCon. According to her, according to
Estonia’s ofﬁcial position, yes. States may respond in a collective manner to a cyberattack, and the
argumentation for this very bold claim was mostly that it does not necessarily bring about escalation or need escalation, but to the contrary, it might lead to the use of milder measures to respond,
because when a state that is under risk of cyberattack and does not lack the technical means, but at
the same time is working in close alliance with other states, but the other states are not allowed to
step in, then the state might, in fact, choose harsher avenues of response.
Secondly, there is the nature of the cyber domain and shared responsibility, just the very fact that
one vulnerability of the territory of one sovereign nation state directly inﬂuences the overall structure. These arguments were chastised and praised to an equal extent, but still there are not many
states that are coming up with bold statements. It is often criticized that it opens up new opportunities for opportunistic unnecessary aggression, but against these claims I would say that collective
or not, countermeasures still have to be proportionate.

M ONICA H AKIMI
Ann, I would like to pin you down, if I may. Let us be technical lawyers for a minute. If you take
the position that collective countermeasures are in some circumstances lawful, they have to be proportionate. They must be intended to have a non-escalatory effect. How do you grapple with the
Draft Articles on State Responsibility in this context? Do you say that collective countermeasures
are generally lawful, and the suggestion in the Draft Articles on State Responsibility that they are
only permissible when taken by a state that is speciﬁcally injured is wrong or dated? Or do you say
that cyber conduct is, in some way, different so that the ordinary principles on countermeasures and
the injured state criterion that the International Law Commission offered up do not apply in this
context?

ANN V ÄLJATAGA
Another question, which is more complicated, is exactly what kind of a cyberattack can be
responded to in a collective manner? Is there such a thing as a violation obligation erga omnes
of cyber sphere? The exact nature of a cyberattack that can be replied to in such a manner, this
is something that, because of the lack of state practice, we cannot illustrate or we cannot offer
any real-life examples, illustrative examples that would help to put this issue into context,
unfortunately.
It is not a matter of whether there are some kind of cyberattacks that might constitute a universal
threat. Probably, there are, but we are yet to ﬁgure out whether such attacks have occurred already
and determine the criteria that we could use to decide whether a particular cyberattack qualiﬁes as,
say, use of force, but not an armed attack, and what kind of cyberattack could actually bring about
collective response?

M ONICA H AKIMI
Okay, great. I want to ask another question and then ask each of you to weigh in, and if you have
thoughts about the countermeasures question, you are welcome to address it. The more general
question that I want to ask starts with the understanding that there is a lot of uncertainty in the
law that governs cyber, both at the broad, general prescription level and as applied in concrete
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cases. Even if we can agree, for example, that some cyber conduct might cross the armed attack
threshold, it is hard to ﬁgure out exactly where that threshold is. There is quite a bit of uncertainty.
The question I have for the governmental lawyers who are actually advising clients on a regular
basis in this space is, how do you lawyer in the face of that uncertainty, and how do you use international law to guide your clients in light of, Doug, something that you mentioned earlier, both the
offensive and the defensive nature of this domain and what states are doing here? And for the nongovernmental lawyers, the question is, what prospects do you see for further clariﬁcation of the
law? Do you think that is something that is realistically in view, or do you think in the near to
medium term, we are likely to continue operating in a zone of uncertainty? Doug, I will start
with you, and then we can just go Doug, Sue, Chuck, Zhixiong, Ann, and wrap it up.

DOUG W ILSON
Thanks, Monica. I will try to be brief. How do we approach this? I think what we try to do, as I
said at the start, is look at cyber power in the round, understand the linkages and interaction
between the domestic and international legal frameworks, which we are applying both at the
same time to the same situations as will many other countries.
Cyber is not unusual in that sense. There are many areas of state conduct and international affairs
in which you have to approach it in that way.
What I would say is that, certainly, over the last few years, there has been a lot more common
understanding and common cause about the general principles and application of those principles
than there was before. I think it is possible to overstate the uncertainty in this area, even recognizing
that we want to see further discussion and alignment of how the law applies in the speciﬁc activity.
What we are trying to achieve by that is both an ability to attract, as we are able to do in a whole host
of areas, international alliances or calling out bad behavior, as I have seen a range of countries do in
recent years, and also understand the rules applying to the projection of cyber power. Because we
cannot have a situation for those countries that subscribe to an international rules-based system are
unable to project that kind of cyber power in the defending forward way that Chuck mentioned, and
that such offensive activity is conﬁned to those countries that have no regard for the rule of law, at
least in their covert actions.
What we are trying to do as international lawyers is like any other area, especially emerging areas
over decades, understand the laws that apply, come to common understandings as to what activity
is permitted and what is not, and then I think there will over the course of future years be room for
progressive development and rule-making in this space when the time is right and when the countries can come together to do that in a meaningful and sensible way. Thanks.

S UE ROBERTSON
Beautifully said, Doug. I agree with many of those sentiments, so thank you.
In quick time, I just want to consider “what do we do?” We start with fundamental ﬁrst principles, and we go from there. And we have to understand the object and purpose of what the law is
trying to do. One thing we have really tried hard to do where the law is less certain is to publicly
express our view of where the legal interpretations lie, because we believe we have responsibility
as states to do so, to explain state practice recognizing that state practice in this area is hard to
describe at times. Often we are left more with describing opinio juris. But I think if states are
not willing to do that, to ﬁll that gap and describe their own bright lines, others will ﬁll that gap
for us and may take the law in a direction that we think is less useful. That is why we have been
attempting to make public some of those legal views and through case studies as well. I know
NATO has done this as well. I think the case studies are really a good example of trying to
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show the application of the basic principles of international law to hypothetical situations and to
show that legal reasoning, how it can assist in deﬁning international wrongs and promoting peaceful dispute resolution processes.

CHARLES A LLEN
Well, thank you for those comments. Actually, what Sue said leads right into what I wanted to
say. Starting with ﬁrst principles, understanding the object and purposes of what the law is trying to
do, and especially where the law is less certain, states have a responsibility to express publicly their
views on the law that applies. As we address these questions, we need to have a sense of both
humility and pragmatism, and as Sue said, adhere to ﬁrst principles. We need to keep in mind
that balance is required, that the same rule of international law that we conclude authorizes the
U.S. military to conduct a cyber operation can also legitimately be applied against the United
States. We need to avoid opportunistic shifting of legal views and instead provide consistent
advice, principled advice.
I would like to comment about some of the speeches I have referred to. I am happy that during the
last administration, the Obama administration, a number of very useful and important speeches
were given. Senior counsel got together and took up the challenge of explaining publicly and in
as much detail as we could the bases for U.S. actions, including in counterterrorism operations and
such speciﬁc areas as cyber. In this context, we have the Harold Koh speech in 2012, and the follow-on Brian Egan speech in 2016, which talked about elections interference—even before it
became such a prominent issue. Then we followed up with some other speeches, and I am
happy to say much the same has been done in this administration. Likewise, we in the United
States appreciate what other countries are saying, such as in the UK attorney general’s speech.
I appreciate and am intrigued by many of the things said today, including what Ann said about
the Estonian statement on collective countermeasures.
I believe this process should continue. After Paul Ney’s speech in March 2020, there were statements in support of the speech and some critiques, as one would expect. Although the pandemic
has made things extremely difﬁcult for all of us, I am sure that this good and healthy discourse
including discussions like this one we have had today will serve us really well. I would emphasize
particularly the opportunity to hear from states. Continued participation by states in the norm-creation process, even in the sense of non-binding norms, as in the continuing work of the UN Group
of Governmental Experts, whose work since approximately 2010 has made a valuable contribution
and continues. We should continue on this path, understanding that no one has a corner on the market of righteousness in these matters. We need to be open to each other, keep exploring, and keep
listening to one another. Thank you.

M ONICA H AKIMI
Wonderful. Zhixiong?

ZHIXIONG HUANG
I think the application of international law in cyberspace is a useful ﬁrst step toward rule of law in
cyberspace, but with the international legal framework as applied in cyberspace is too general to
provide the necessary legal certainty. That uncertainty needs to be addressed.
I see two possible approaches. One is to enhance discussion and dialogue among nations. I
would like to mention the two ongoing processes within the UN, the UN Open-Ended Working
Group (OEWG) and the new UN Group of Governmental Experts (GGE). For example, China
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in last September for the ﬁrst time issued a position paper in the OEWG, at least partly relating to
the application of international law in cyberspace, which is publicly available. That shows the discussion among states has generated encouraging progress.
The other is the possibility to supplement and to ﬁll in the gaps in international law with soft law
initiatives. This is what is already being done in reality. For example, in the 2015 UN GGE Report,
we can see in paragraph 28(b) that states must comply with their obligations under international
law to respect and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms. At the same time, the Report
also made the view in paragraph 13(e) in the section on “norms, rules, and principles for the responsible behavior of States,” that states, in ensuring the secure use of ICTs should respect the relevant
Human Rights Council resolutions as well as the General Assembly resolutions to guarantee
respect for right to privacy, right to freedom of expression, and other human rights.
It is like how the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, which was
non-binding at that time, elaborated on and clariﬁed the human rights provisions in the UN Charter.
I think this trend, the mutual reinforcing of soft law, the non-binding norms, and binding international law, will continue in the coming years.

M ONICA H AKIMI
Thank you. Ann, I am going to ask you to wrap up for us with some ﬁnal comments, if you have
any, and then I will say thank you.

ANN V ÄLJATAGA
As for the last question, just very quickly, as I am one of the panelists who has no experience with
being a state legal adviser, I would like to thank everybody involved in fact-forming the state’s
opinion on cyber matters because recently, say during last two years, we have been reading and
receiving interesting, relevant, on point, and strong writings expressing state opinions. We have
Australia, the UK, the Netherlands, Estonia, and France expressing explicitly their positions on
international law as applied to cyber operations. In addition to this, we are witnessing legal vocabulary, and legal-sounding statements or legally meaningful statements in national cybersecurity or
cyber defense strategies more and more. For me, personally, this is even more an interesting and
relevant read, and I feel it to be more signiﬁcant to the emergence of international cyber law than
some of the many soft law norms-based instruments. This is where I would like to show my appreciation to everybody in fact involved in creating this kind of state legal opinion.

M ONICA H AKIMI
I think that expression of gratitude is a great place to end. I want to thank all of you for taking the
time to meet with us today, and thanks to ASIL for having us. Thanks to our audiences who are still
with us. I look forward to learning more about these topics from all of you as life progresses. To
conclude, I will just clap on behalf of everyone in the room. Goodbye.
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